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legislation as is found in the majority opinion. If the legis-
lative body intends that an employee, in the position of the 
plaintiff here, may be removed from his position, it is its sole 
prerogative to say so. It is not the function of this court 
to determine that the charter provision, so obviously meant 
to provide for the discharge of an employee guilty of mis-
conduct, applies to one suffering from a physical disability. 
If, as I am convinced it does, the charter makes no provision 
for the removal of a person in the category in which plain-
tiff finds himself, undoubtedly the situation could be remedied 
by the pr·oper authorities in a very short period of time. It 
is not the duty of this court to supply the missing links in 
the legislative chain. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment with directions 
to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff 
directing his restoration to his position in the Department of 
Fire of the City of Los Angeles without loss of pay. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 31, 
1952. Shenk, J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 21820. In Bank. Mar. 3, 1952.] 
CITY OF VERNON et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR 
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY et al., Re-
spondents. 
[1] Injunctions- Violation- Certainty.- Petitioners cannot be 
guilty of contempt if the injunction which they violated is so 
uncertain that they could not determine what it required them 
to do. 
[2] Id.-Judgment.-In California resort may be had to the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law to clarify any uncertainty 
or ambiguity in an injunction. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Injunctions, § 78; Am.Jur., Injunctions, § 334. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Injunctions, §91; [2,3,5] Injunc-
tions, § 74; [4] Injunctions, § 109(2); [6, 7] Contempt, § 42; [8] 
Contempt, §55; [9, 11] Contempt, §56; [10] Contempt, § 80; 
[12,13] Contempt, §32; [14] Injunctions, §90.5; [15] Contempt, 
§ 68. 
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[3] Id.-Judgment-Certainty.-An injunction requiring the city 
of Vernon and members of the city council to arrange for 
payment of the city's "proportionate share" of the cost of a 
new sewage disposal plant "according to the gallonage allotted 
to said corporation" and have such undetermined sums "avail-
able as required," is not uncertain where the findings set forth 
a definite formula for computation of this share of the cost 
and, together with the pleadings, make it clear that the money 
is to be paid to the city of Los Angeles, the builder of the 
new facilities. 
[ 4] I d.-Appeal- Supersedeas-Mandatory Injunctions.-Provi-
sions of a mandatory injunction are stayed by an appeal. 
[5] Id.-Judgment.-Under an injunction requiring the city of 
Vernon to make certain financial arrangements "within ninety 
days after the entry of this decree," the 90 days com-
menced to run when the judgment, which was stayed by an 
appeal, became final after disposition of the appeal. 
[6] Contempt-Affidavit.-An affidavit charging contempt by a 
city and members of the city council for failure to comply 
with an injunction requiring them to make certain financial 
arrangements within a prescribed time after entry of the 
decree sufiiciently shows their personal knowledge of final 
disposition of proceedings to review the decree by its aver-
ments that, after the decree became final, they took certain 
steps in attempted compliance with certain provisions thereof. 
[7] Id.-Affidavit.-An affidavit charging contempt by a city and 
members of its council for failure to comply with an in-
junction requiring them to make certain financial arrangements 
within a prescribed time need not allege that they intended 
to violate the injunction; it is sufficient if it appears from 
the affidavit that the citees, with knowledge of the injunction 
and with ability to comply, did not obey it. 
[8] Id.-Evidence.-Case against persons cited for contempt is 
not required to be proved by the person who made the 
affidavit of contempt, rather than by the testimony of other 
witnesses and by documentary evidence. 
[9] Id.-Evidence.-In a contempt proceeding there was sufficient 
evidence that petitioners, a city and four members of its 
council, had knowledge of the terms of a mandatory injunc-
tion which they failed to obey where three of the petitioners 
were members of the council when the injunction decree was 
rendered, and thereafter, an attorney representing the city 
and council appeared before the council, "gave a report on 
the matter and advised them that an appeal should be taken," 
[6] See Cal.Jur., Contempt, § 38; Am.Jur., Contempt, § 68. 
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which was done, and the court was justified in inferring that 
the fourth council member, who became such after the decree 
was entered, learned of the existence of the judgment in the 
due performance of his duties. 
[10] !d.-Certiorari-Scope of Review.-In a proceeding to review 
a judgment finding the accused guilty of contempt, the re-
viewing court will not construe the evidence in favor of the 
accused as this would violate the rule that review of the 
evidence is limited to determining whether there was any 
substantial evidence before the trial court to sustain its juris-
diction. 
[11] !d.-Evidence.-Where a city and the members of its coun-
cil had knowledge of the terms of an injunction requiring them 
to pay the proportionate cost of a sewage disposal plant, and 
had ability to comply therewith but did not do so, it could 
reasonably be inferred that their action was intentional de-
spite express disclaimers of contemptuous intent. 
[12] !d.-Defenses-Disclaimer of Intent.-Disclaimer of an intent 
to commit contempt is no defense where a contempt clearly 
appears from the circumstances constituting the act. 
[13] !d.-Defenses-Disclaimer of Intent.-One cannot justify 
disobedience of an order of court on the ground that it was 
based on the advice of counsel; neither can such disobedience 
be excused by the fact that it was in good faith and under 
a mistake as to the law. 
[14] Injunctions-Performance and Enforcement of.-Where an 
injunction requires the city of Vernon and members of the 
city council to arrange for payment of the city's "propor-
tionate share" of the cost of a new sewage disposal plant 
built by the city of Los Angeles, the institution of further 
litigation on old eontracts allegedly made by Los Angeles to 
dispose of Vernon's sewage is not compliance with the in-
junction, and such litigation remains open for determination 
on its merits, unaffected by the injunction decree. 
[15] Contempt-Imprisonment Until Performance of Act.-While 
most omissions which are contempts cannot be corrected while 
the contemnor is in jail, if he indicates his willingness in 
good faith to perform, he would be entitled, and will be allowed, 
to leave the jail in order to do so. 
PROCEEDING to review a judgment of the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County holding petitioners in contempt of 
court. Joseph W. Vickers, Judge. Affirmed. 
[12] See Cal.Jur., Contempt, § 45; Am.Jur., Contempt, § 73. 
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Carson B. Hubbard, City Attorney, Edward R Young, 
John F. O'Hara and John \V. Shenk. III, for Petitioners. 
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General, 
and Bayard Rhone, Deputy Attorney General, for Respond-
ents. 
SCHAUER, J.-The city of Vernon and the five members 
of its city council were found guilty of contempt for failing 
to obey a mandatory injunction. The petitioners here include 
the city and four members of the council. 'l'he trial court 
ordered that each petitioner pay a fine, that the individual 
petitioners be confined in the Los Angeles county jail for a 
period of five days, and that the individual petitioners be 
detained in jail until they, as members of the city council, 
complete all arrangements for financing Vernon's share of 
the cost of a sewage disposal plant as hereinafter described. 
In this proceeding the petitioners seek certiorari to annul the 
judgment of contempt. Their contentions are directed not 
only at the validity of the contempt proceeding but also at 
the injunction decree, which has long since become final. We 
have concluded that the judgment of contempt should be 
affirmed. 
For many years Vernon and others, pursuant to contracts 
with the city of Los Angeles, disposed of their sewage through 
the Los Angeles sewer system, which emptied into Santa 
Monica Bay. Thus there was created and maintained a public 
nuisance so noisome and notorious as to finally (December 13, 
1943) provoke the State of California into bringing the abate-
ment action which forms the basis for this proceeding. By 
such action the People of the State of California sought to 
restrain the municipal and public corporations which used the 
Los Angeles sewer system, and their officers and employes, 
from discharging sewage into Santa Monica Bay without a 
permit and to abate the public nuisance which resulted from. 
their sewage disposal. Judgment for plaintiff was entered on 
February 1, 1946, and affirmed (People v. City of Los Angeles 
(1948), 83 Cal.App.2d 627 [189 P.2d 489]); this court denied 
hearing; and the United States Supreme Court denied certi-
orari (335 U.S. 852 [69 S.Ct. 80, 93 L.Ed. 400]). 
The judgment in material part required that Los Angeles 
build a sewage treatment plant of sufficient capacity to abate 
the nuisance; that each corporate defendant either should 
provide its own facilities for disposing of its sewage in a safe 
and sanitary manner or should "within ninety days after the 
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entry of this decree have . . . completed all arrangements 
necessary for the :financing of its proportionate share of said 
new treatment plant ... [to be built by Los Angeles] ac-
cording to the gallonage allotted to said corporation, so that 
said share will be available as required'' ; each corporate 
defendant which elected to use the Los Angeles sewage system 
was ordered to report to the superior court, on or before 
April 29, 1946, the arrangements which it made to pay for 
its share of the plant ; the superior court retained jurisdiction 
to inake further orders to carry its decree into full effect. 
Those are the material terms of the decree which has become 
final. 
The affidavit by which this contempt proceeding was in-
stituted contains the following averments: Vernon elected to 
use the Los Angeles sewage system. After the denial of 
certiorari, the trial court ordered the corporate defendants, 
which had so elected, to report to it on or before August 
29, 1949, what they had done to comply with the portion 
of the judgment requiring them to arrange to :finance their 
share of the cost of the plant. Vernon, instead of reporting 
its arrangements, reported its reasons for not having complied 
with that portion of the judgment. Each member of the city 
eouncil of Vernon has personal knowledge of the terms of 
the judg·ment. Neither Vernon nor the council has taken any 
steps to provide the money necessary to pay Vern on's share 
of the cost of such plant, although they have the ability to do so. 
Certainty of Injunction 
[1] Petitioners cannot be guilty of contempt if the in-
junction which they violated is so uncertain that they could 
not determine what it required them to do. (Weber v. Superior 
Court (1945), 26 Cal.2d144, 148 [156 P.2d 923].) Petitioners 
have been found guilty of violating those provisions of the 
injunction which required them to arrange for payment of 
Vern on's "proportionate share" of the cost of the plant "ac-
cording to the gallonage allotted to said corporation'' and 
have such undetermined (but ascertainable) sums ''available 
as required.'' They contend that the judgment is fatally 
uncertain beeause it does not determine the amount or frac-
tional interest which constitutes Vernon's "proportionate 
share'' or what the cost of the plant will be or how much 
''gallonage'' has been allotted to Vernon or to whom or how 
38 C.2d-17 
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or when the undetermined sum shall be ''available as re-
quired.'' 
[2] In California "resort may be had to the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law to clarify any uncertainty or 
ambiguity" in an injunction. (Gelfand v. O'Haver (1948), 
33 Cal.2d 218, 222 [200 P.2d 790] ; see, also, Ophir Creek 
Water Co. v. Ophir Hill Consol. Min. Co. (1923), 61 Utah 
551 [216 P. 490, 492], where the court said, "In arriving 
(at a correct interpretation of the decree and its meaning 
\and effect it is incumbent upon the court to consider not only 
\the language of the decree . . . but also the purpose and 
/object of the litigation which terminated in the decree"; a 
'judgment of contempt for violation of the disputed terms of 
the decree was upheld.) 
[3] If petitioners will consider the 1946 injunction in the 
light of the findings of fact and conclusions of law and ''the 
purpose and object of the litigation which terminated in the 
decree,'' as made evident by the pleadings, they will be able 
to comply with it. The findings give a definite formula for 
computation of Vern on's share of the cost; they make it clear 
that this share is to be paid to Los Angeles; and if Vernon 
had desired to comply with the decree it could have ascer-
tained the precise amount to be paid at any fixed time by con-
sultation with Los Angeles and, if necessary, under court 
supervisiOn. As already mentioned, the court had retained 
jurisdiction to this very end. Other cities, parties to the same 
basic litigation and subject to the same judgment, have been 
able to understand and comply with its terms. Also, it is to 
be remembered, Vern on voluntarily elected to accept these 
terms of the decree, for abatement of its share of the nuisance, 
rather than to adopt the alternative of providing its own 
facilities for sewage disposal. It is not reasonable to infer that 
Vernon made such election without knowing what it was 
undertaking. Vernon's share of the cost of the plant based 
upon estimates known to it at the time of the entry of the 
decree would have been $901,250. Vernon made no attempt 
to raise or appropriate this or any other sum. From time 
to time the estimated cost of the plant increased, but Vern on 
made no effort to compute or raise its share of the increased 
cost. 
In October, 1949, Los Angeles demanded $1,814,952.60 as 
Vernon's share; petitioners by resolution took the position 
that the 1946 judgment "now requires the payment by The 
City of Vernon of $901,250.00, and . . . gives no legal basis 
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for the demand of or the payment of $1,814,952.60" and that 
Los Angeles purportedly allotted to Vernon "10,129,968 
gallons per day instead of 10,300,000 gallons per day as 
allotted by said judgment." It thus appears that in October, 
1949, petitioners recognized tbat the 1946 judgment required 
them to raise money to be paid to Los Angeles but took the 
erroneous position that a liquidated, rather than a to-be-
calculated, amount to be raised and paid was fixed by that 
judgment. Their present claim that they do not know to 
whom the money should be paid does not appear to be ad-
vanced in good faith. Indeed, as will hereafter appear, their 
chief objection to the injunction appears to be not so much 
that it is uncertain but that notwithstanding the finality of 
the judgment, it is erroneous. The judgment, of course, makes 
abatement of the nuisance an absolute requirement not de-
pendent on the cost thereof. 
Snjfie?.ency of Affidavit 
Petitioners urge that the affidavit by which this proceeding 
was begun is fatally defective because it does not allege the 
elate when they should have complied with the January, 1946, 
judgment. As stated, that judgment required that Vernon 
make its financial arrangements "within ninety days after 
the entry of this decree." [4] The mandatory provisions of 
the judgment were stayed by the appeal (City of Pasadena v. 
City of Alhambra (1946), 75 Cal.App.2d 91, 95 [170 P.2d 
499]) and the District Court of Appeal further stayed en-
forcement of the judgment until final decision of the United 
States Supreme Court on the petition for certiorari. Thus 
the 90 days after entry of the decree had long since passed 
when the judgment became final. The trial court did not 
fix, and Vernon did not ask it to fix, a new date for perform-
ance. 
[5] In the contempt proceeding the trial judge took the 
position that the 90 days commenced to run when the judg-
ment became final. This view is supported by Fenton v. 
Farmers' & ll1e1·chants' Nat. Bank (1901), 27 Tex. Civ. App. 
231 [65 S.W. 199, 201]. There a decree awarded land to 
plaintiff on condition that it pay a certain sum "within 90 
clays from the date of said decree"; the judgment was stayed 
pending appeal. It 'Nas held that the 90-day period began 
to run when the judgment became final after disposition of 
the appeal. In accord are Southern Oil Co. v. Scales (1902, 
Tex. Civ.App.), 69 S.W. 1033; N on·is v. Kelsey (1915), 60 Colo. 
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297, 300 [152 P. 1167]; and Uthoff v. Thompson (1933), 176 
La. 599 [146 So. 161, 165]. 'rhis position is fair to petitioners 
and we are in accord with it. 
Petitioners rely upon In re McDonald (1932), 217 Cal. 29, 
31 [16 P.2d 995], for the proposition that the affidavit must 
show that they had personal knowledge of the outcome of the 
appeal and the petition for certiorari, and upon Phillips v. 
Superior Court (1943), 22 Cal.2d 256, 258 [137 P.2d 838], 
for the proposition that the fact that they were parties to those 
proceedings does not charge them with knowledge of the out-
come thereof. However, on the facts established here, those 
cases clearly are not controlling. [6] The affidavit sufficiently 
shows petitioners' personal knowledge of the final disposition 
of the proceedings to review the injunction decree by its 
averments that after that decree became final petitioners took 
certain steps (the filing of an application1 for a permit to use 
the new plant ·and the making of a report to the trial court 
stating ''its reasons for not having complied with . . . [a 
certain provision] of the judgment") in attempted com-
pliance with certain provisions of the decree (not the pro-
visions under consideration in this contempt proceeding). 
(See Romine v. Cralle (1890), 83 Cal. 432, 437 [23 P. 525].) 
[7] Petitioners attack the sufficiency of the affidavit on the 
further ground that it does not allege that they intended to 
violate the injunction. They rely on Hutton v. Superior Court 
(1905), 147 Cal. 156, 160 [81 P. 409]. It is there said, 
''Contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in their nature, 
and an intent to commit a forbidden act is as essential to guilt 
as in the case of a criminal offense.'' This is not to say, as 
petitioners seem to believe, that the affidavit must contain 
the words ''intent to violate the terms of the injunction''; 
it is sufficient if it appears from the affidavit, as it does here, 
that the citees, with knowledge of the injunction and with 
ability to comply, did not obey it. (See Hume v. Superior 
Court (1941), 17 Cal.2d 506, 513 [110 P.2d 669]; Ex parte 
Creely (1908), 8 Cal.App. 713, 719 [97 P. 766] .) 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
[8] Petitioners urge that because John Leggett, who made 
the affidavit of contempt, did not testify, the evidence is in-
1As shown by the affidavit for contempt, the application was filed on 
August 24, 1949 (after the judgment had become final) and such appli-
cation avers that ''This application is made pursuant to the Order of 
the Superior Court ... contained in that certain Judgment,'' etc., the 
judgment identified being the basic injunction decree herein concerned. 
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sufficient to support the finding that they were in contempt. 
They cite no authority and give no reason in support of their 
claim that the case against them should be proved by the 
affiant, rather than by the testimony of other witnesses and 
by documentary evidence. 
[9] Petitioners also contend that there is no evidence that 
they had knowledge of the terms of the injunction. This 
contention is wholly lacking in merit. In 1946, when the 
judgment was rendered, three of the four individual peti-
tioners were members of the Vern on city council. There is 
evidence that after the judgment was rendered Mr. Young, 
an attorney who represented the city and the council, ap-
peared before the council, ''gave a report on the matter and 
advised them that an appeal should be taken," and the council 
authorized him to do so. The trial court was justified in 
inferring that the three petitioners who were members of the 
council in 1946 retained their knowledge of the existence of 
the judgment until it became final and that petitioner R. J. 
Furlong, who became a councilman in 1948 and has served 
as such since then, learned of the existence of the judgment 
in the due performance of his official duties. Also, as already 
shown (see footnote 1, supra), an application indicating 
knowledge of the terms of the judgment was filed with the 
State Department of Public Health on August 24, 1949. 
Likewise, the report to the superior court (filed on or about 
August 26, 1949) stating reasons for not having complied 
with the judgment indicates knowledge of its existence and 
its terms. Although it is said in Groves v. Superior Court 
(1944), 62 Cal.App.2d 559, 568 (145 P.2d 355], and in In re 
Felthoven (1946), 75 Cal.App.2d 465, 470 (171 P.2d 47], that 
''the evidence . . . [is] to be strictly construed in favor of 
the accused,'' the annulment of the contempt orders in those 
cases was not based on a view of the evidence least favorable 
to upholding the order. [10] For a reviewing court to construe 
the evidence in favor of accused would violate the rule that 
''the review of the evidence is limited to determining whether 
there was any substantial evidence before the trial court to 
sustain its jurisdiction." (Bridges v. Superior Court (1939), 
14 Cal.2d 464, 485 [94 P.2d 983), and cases there cited.) 2 
Here, the evidence on any reasonable view amply sustains 
all essential findings. 
"The Bridges case was reversed on other grounds (314 U.S. 252 [62 
S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192)). 
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[11] Petitioners further assert that there is no evidence 
that they intended to violate the injunction. Petitioners, with 
knowledge of the terms of the injunction and ability to comply 
therewith, did not do so ; it can be reasonably inferred that 
their inaction was intentional, despite express disclaimers of 
contemptuous intent. [12] "Disclaimer of an intent to com-
mit contempt is no defense where a contempt clearly appears 
from the circumstances constituting the act. [13] And one 
cannot justify disobedience of an order of the court upon the 
ground that it was based upon the advice of counsel; neither 
can such disobedience be excused by the fact that it was in 
good faith and under a mistake as to the law." (5 Cal.Jur., 
Contempt, § 45; see, also, HaverneyM· v. Superior Coud 
(1890), 87 Cal. 267, 274 [25 P. 433, 10 L.R.A. 650].) 
Asserted Compliance with the Injunction 
Petitioners admit that they "have not exercised any 
official powers to levy a tax or to incur a bonded indebtedness 
or impose any . . . charges, to provide the means by which 
said municipal corporation could or might raise ... the 
monies necessary for the payment of the city's alleged propor-
tionate share of the cost of construction of the new treatment 
plant so that its share would be available as required," but 
they contend that they have taken other means to comply 
with the injunction; namely, on advice of counsel, in 1949, 
they brought an action against Los Angeles in which they 
allege that in 1909 and 1938 Vern on made contracts with 
Los Angeles whereby the latter agreed to dispose of Vernon's 
sewage; Vernon claims rights to sewage disposal under these 
contracts without payment of its share of the cost of the new 
plant.3 
[14] It is manifest that the institution of further litiga-
tion is not compliance with the injunction. The issues raised 
in the injunction proceeding have been litigated and finally 
adjudicated. The obvious purpose of the injunction was to 
get the nuisance promptly abated and to that end to get the 
new plant built and paid for without the delay attendant 
on independent or later ensuing litigation to determine the 
validity and effect of the old contracts of Vern on and other 
corporate defendants. As to these contracts the District Court 
of Appeal said (p. 648 of 83 Cal.App.2d), "This is a pro-
ceeding initiated by the people of the State of California on 
3 The very bringing of this action constitutes further evidence of 
petitioners' knowledge of the injunction decree. 
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behalf of the state itself ... to abate a public nuisance. 
Therefore, the court rightfully refrained from passing upon 
any of the rights, obligations or liabilities affecting the various 
defendants by reason of their contractual relations with each 
other, and left those matters open for future adjudication in 
a proper proceeding. Although the aforesaid contracts con-
cerned the disposal of sewage, the court would not be justified 
in this action to adjudicate the rights existing between the 
various appellants by reason of their contracts one with the 
other. Insofar as the judgment herein is concerned, if any 
of the appellants have any rights against the city of Los 
Angeles, or vice versa, by reason of any existing contract, 
such rights have been preserved and may be enforced in a 
proper action.'' 
This ruling preserves to petitioners all contractual rights 
they may possess under the mentioned contracts but likewise 
it requires them to settle or litigate those rights independently 
of compliance with the injunction decree. Vernon's continued 
reliance on its 1909 and 1938 contracts with Los Angeles is, 
in effect, a refusal to abandon contentions which were made 
and decided against it in the injunction suit. The judgment 
in that suit and the decision of the District Court of Appeal, 
which has become final, conclusively establish that the bring-
ing of actions upon the old contracts with Los Angeles is 
not compliance with the injunction and that such litigation 
remains open for determination on its merits, unaffected by 
the injunction decree. ( N orr1:s v. San Mateo County Tme Co. 
(19fi1), 37 Cal.2d 269, 272 r231 P.2d 493].) 
[15] The individual petitioners urge that so long as they 
mig·ht be confined in the l10S Angeles county jail pursuant 
to the contempt order they could not comply with the injunc-
tion because they could not meet as a city council in Vernon. 
Respondent answers this contention adequately by pointing 
ont that most omissions which are contempts cannot be cor-
rected while the contemnor is in jail but that, if the contemnor 
indicates his willingness in good faith to perform, he would 
be entitled, and will be allowed, to leave the jail in order 
to do so. 
'rhe conduct of the petitioning councilmen which was found 
contemptuous wa;;; not the conduct of private individuals 
but that of pnblic officials protecting the interests of the 
Pmnicipalitv which they were elected to serve, acting nnder 
the advice of connsel; and since the making of the contempt 
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order they have fully complied with the requirements of the 
injunction. The argument is made on behalf of petitioners 
that by reason of those facts the punishment of the individual 
petitioners by fine and imprisonment is so extreme as to be 
beyond the range of proper judicial discretion. Such argu-
ment, however, is not a proper one to address to this court 
at this time. It includes facts not all of which were before 
the trial court at the time of the proceedings under review. 
Our power of review on the present record is limited, by 
section 1074 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to a determina-
tion "whether the infer\?r tribunal . . . has regularly pur-
sued the authority of such tribunal,'' and the reasonableness 
of the punishment cannot be passed upon in these review pro-
ceedings (see In re Carboni (1941), 46 Cal.App.2d 605, 614 
[116 P.2d 453]). The trial court, however, on its own motion 
or on application by petitioners, may remit the unexecuted 
provision of the judgment that petitioners personally be pun-
ished for contempt. The argument based on the mitigating 
circumstances above mentioned may in all propriety be ad-
dressed to that court, and it is to be presumed that it will 
take into consideration such mitigating circumstances and 
make an order appropriate in the premises. 
For the reasons above stated the judgment of contempt is 
affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J. pro 
tern., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the conclusion that, under 
applicable principles, the petitioners were guilty of contempt. 
I base this concurrence solely upon the ground that Vernon's 
suit against the city of Los Angeles was not filed within the 
time fixed by the injunction for complying with its provision. 
The judgm1mt in the abatement action required each city 
which did not provide its own sewage disposal facilities to 
complete ''all arrangements necessary for the financing of its 
proportionate share of said new treatment plant" within 90 
days. Vernon took no steps within the required time to comply 
with that order. However, prior to the commencement of the 
contempt proceedings, it filed an action against the city of 
Los Angeles seeking to avoid any liability for the cost of 
the Hyperion plant or to recover such amounts as might be 
due under existing contracts. 
The injunction in no way restricts the ''arrangements'' 
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which the city make to meet its obligations. Any rights 
it has in the contracts sued upon are assets. Certainly if its 
position is upheld, it will be able to satisfy all demands 
which may be made upon it for payment of its share of the 
cost of the new treatment plant. 
The course which Vernon took was open to it under the 
injunction provisions. In affirming the judgment in the 
abatement action, it was held: ''This is a proceeding initiated 
by the people of the State of California on behalf of the 
state itself, and on behalf of the State Department of Public 
Health, as well as other state agencies, against all named 
defendants, to abate a public nuisance. Therefore, the court 
rightfully refrained from passing upon any of the rights, 
obligations or liabilities affecting the various defendants by 
reason of their contractual relations with each other, and 
left those matters open for future adjudication in a proper 
proceeding. Although the aforesaid contracts concerned the 
disposal of sewage, the court would not be justified in this 
action to adjudicate the rights existing between the various 
appellants by reason of their contracts one with the other. 
Insofar as the judgment herein is concerned, if any of the 
appellants have any rights against the city of Los .Angele&, or 
vice versa, by reason of any existing contract, such rights 
have been preserved and may be enforced in a proper action. 
All of appellants' property and rights were preserved to them 
and the judgment in the instant action does not impair or 
violate any of their constitutional rights." (People v. City 
of Los Angeles, 83 Cal..App.2d 627, 648 [189 P.2d 489).) 
This language is said to have required the city "to settle 
or litigate those rights independently of compliance with the 
injunction decree.'' Further, it is read as a determination of 
the present controversy. 
I do not so interpret the opinion. The clear import of the 
decision of the District Coure of Appeal is that the abatement 
action was not the proper proceeding in which to adjudicate 
private rights. The contract rights of all parties were spe-
cifically preserved. The question as to whether there were 
rjghts which would reduce or eliminate financial obligations 
under the injunction was specifically left open. It is clear 
that the only result of the abatement proceeding was to 
determine the duties of the respective defendants in abating 
the nuisance. Whether, as between each other, there existed 
.,.;f)'hf,s to have one assume the resnonsibilities o.f another. was 
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not determined. Clearly an action to secure judicial deter-
mination of these rights was a possible "arrangement" which 
would comply with the injunction. 
I, therefore, find no basis for holding that the petitioners 
are continuing to violate the injunction. At most, there was 
a mere technical violation of the court's decree by the failure 
to sue within 90 days. There is no showing that, by the 
delay of a few days, the petitioners in any way impeded or 
subverted the ultimate purpose of the injunction. In a case 
such as this, where it is claimed that public officials have 
not performed their duties, sound public policy should require 
a much greater flouting of the court's authority than the 
technical violation of one phase of the involved and com-
plicated order of this case. 
In my opinion, onE!'claiming that a judgment of the kind 
here involved has been disobeyed should be required to show 
that the delay has in some way obstructed the fulfillment of 
the purpose for which the judgment was rendered. In the 
present case, the failure to comply with the court's order 
within the specified time has not delayed the abatement of the 
nuisance nor obstructed the carrying out of the court's pur-
pose. This is an additional circumstance which the trial court 
may well consider in determining whether the unexecuted 
portion of the judgment should be remitted. 
I would modify the judgment by striking therefrom the 
order for the continuing imprisonment of petitioners C. W. 
Trowbridge, C. H. Mailliard, Genevieve Anderson and R. J. 
Furlong. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
In my opinion the judgment of contempt should be annulled 
for two rea!'lons : ( 1) The insufficiency of the affidavit upon 
which the order to show cause in re contempt was based; 
and (2) the uncertainty and ambiguity of the injunction which 
has allegedly been violated. 
Insufficiency of the Affidavit 
The affidavit of John T. Leggett, assistant sanitary engineer 
of the Bureau of Sanitary Engineering of the State Depart-
ment of Public Health of Los Angeles, does not allege the 
date on which petitioners were required to comply with the 
terms of the judgment of January, 1946. The judgment pro-
vides as follows : ''It is further Ordered, Adjudged And 
Decreed that as to those corporate defendants who do not 
adopt some method of disposing of sewage originating in the 
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corporate limits of such defendants other than a new treat-
ment works at Hyperion, that such defendant shall, within 
ninety days after the entry of this decree, have filed an 
application with the State Department of Public Health of the 
State of California for a permit to discharge its sewage 
through a proposed new treatment plant to be built at 
Hyperion, and that such defendants shall have by said time 
completed all arrangements necessary for the financing of 
its proportionate share of said new treatment plant or works 
according to the gallonage allotted to said corporation so that 
said share will be available as required.'' The affidavit sets 
forth a statement to the effect that an appeal was taken from 
said judgment to the District Court of .Appeal, and was 
affirmed on February 11, 1948; that petitioners sought certi-
orari in the United States Supreme Court which was denied 
,in October, 1948, and "that the judgment of this Court is 
now :final.'' There is no allegation that the 90-day period 
commenced to run from any particular time, or that it has 
now expired. In In re McDonald, 217 Cal. 29, 31 [16 P.2d 
995], it was held that personal knowledge of the existence 
and status of a decree must be alleged. The affidavit contains 
an allegation that all ''of said persons named above has 
personal knowledge of all the terms and provisions of said 
judgment,'' but it was held by this court in Phillips v. 
8nperior Cmt1·t, 22 Cal.2d 256 [137 P.2d 838], that an allega-
tion that the citee had actual knowledge of a judgment in an 
action to which he was a party is not sufficient to show that he 
had knowledge that the judgment had been affirmed on appeal 
and had become final. 
Petitioners also contend, and, in my opinion with merit, 
that the affidavit is insufficient because it did not allege (nor 
was there testimony to the effect) that they intended to 
violate the injunction relying on Hutton v. Superior Court, 
147 Cal. 156, 160 [81 P. 409], wherein it was said: "Contempt 
proceedings are quasi-criminal in their nature, and an intent 
to commit a forbidden act is as essential to guilt as in the case 
of a charge of a criminal offense." The majority answers this 
contention by saying that it is sufficient if it appears from the 
affidavit ''as it does here, that the citees, with knowledge of 
the injunction and with ability to comply, did not obey it.'' 
The effect of the two errors is to allow a judgment of contempt 
to rest upon two assumptions-that the petitioners had knowl-
edge of the time the 90-day period commenced to run and 
intended to violate the injunction. The majority bases its 
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,>,finding of intention to violate the injunction on its assump-
tion of petitioners' knowledge of the time within which the 
90-day period was to run. 
The California courts have held that reviewing courts are 
to construe the af-fidavit in a contempt proceeding very strictly 
in favor of the accused and that no intendments are indulged 
in aid of its suf-ficiency (In re F'elthoven, 75 Cal.App.2d 
465, 470 [171 P.2d 47] ; F'1·owley v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. 
220, 224 [110 P. 817] .) In the Felthoven case it was said 
that ''The af-fidavit, the order to show cause, the evidence and 
the findings in a contempt of court proceeding are to be 
strictly construed in favor of the accused, and the presumption 
in favor of the regularity of the proceedings and the judg-
ment does not apply in contempt matters.'' Yet the majority 
here is assuming facts in order to fill the gaps in the af-fidavit 
and thus uphold the judgment. Since a contempt proceeding 
is "quasi-criminal" in nature (Hutton v. Superior Court, 
147 Cal. 156 [81 P. 409]) this method of af-firmance can hardly 
be said to be in accordance with recognized principles of due 
process of law. Another inference drawn by the majority is 
that R. J. Furlong, who did not become a councilman until 
1948, knew of the course of the action because of his official 
capacity. The original judgment was rendered in January, 
1946, but Mr. Furlong is imprisoned because of an inference 
which the majority says must have occurred because of his 
position. In Lindsley v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.App. 419, 
425 [245 P. 212], it was said that the af-fidavit must set forth 
not merely the ultimate facts, but the facts themselves. This 
would seem to be more than applicable here. 
Insttfficiency of the Injunction 
I have quoted the judgment in the first part of this dissent. 
It makes no provision for the amount of money that these 
petitioners shall make ''all arrangements necessary'' to raise, 
and remains silent with respect to whom it shall be paid. 
The majority opinion points out that resort may be had to the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law to clarify any un-
certainty or ambiguity in an injunction (Gelfand v. O'Haver, 
33 Cal.2d 218, 222 [200 P>2c1 790]) and concludes that these 
findings and conclusions, together with the pleadings, make 
it clear that the money is to be paid to the city of Los Angeles, 
that the findings set forth a definite formula for computation 
of Vern on's share of the cost of the sewage disposal plant. 
The findings and conclusions are not 1:ncluded in the record 
before this court, and resort must be had to the case of People 
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v. of Los Angeles, 88 Cal.App.2d 627 [189 P.2d 489] 
(affirming the judgment in the public nuisance action) where 
they are partially set forth. It appears to me that the record 
in th1:s case must speak for ·itself. If petitioners are to be found 
guilty of contempt committed because of an alleged violation 
of a judgment which, in order to be construed, must be in-
terpreted in the light of the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law which preceded it, it would appear to me that the 
burden is being placed on petitioners to prove themselves not 
guilty of the charges against them. This is contrary to settled 
principles of law. Conceding that the majority is correct in 
assuming that resort may be had to the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to explain the judgment, it does not follow 
that this rule is applicable to a case such as this where the 
findings and conclusions are not a part of the record in the 
contempt proceeding. In fact, even though resort is had to 
the decision of the District Court of Appeal on the appeal from 
the judgment in which the injunction was granted, it is 
impossible to determine therefrom what, specifically, defend-
ants are required to do in order to comply with the injunction. 
\Vhere in the judgment is to be found a statement of 
Vernon's proportionate share, which is to be fixed according 
''to the gallonage allotted to said corporation'' 1 In order 
to determine what Vernon's share is, it is necessary, according 
to the majority, for petitioners to go back to the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law filed in the nuisance action and 
use the formula there set forth. Even if this were possible, 
I do not believe such a burden can lawfully be imposed upon 
citees in a contempt action. But, assuming that such a burden 
may be imposed, there is still no definite or ascertainable and 
fixed amount which petitioners can be said to be required 
to raise. In 1946, petitioners' share of the cost of the plant 
"based upon estimates known to it at the time of the entry of 
the decree would have been $901,250 .... In October, 1949, 
Los Angeles demanded $1,814,952.60 as Vernon's share." It 
appears that the original estimate of the total cost of the 
project was to have been $21,000,000, but according to the 
Leggett affidavit. such an amount has already been exceeded 
although the plant was then only 50 per cent complete, 
indicating a probable total cost of some $48,000,000 and, in 
light of the change in economic conditions, a possible total 
cost of many millions more. Petitioners are to be jailed and 
fined £or failing to raise an indefinite and unascertained 
amount of money to be available as required. I agree with 
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petitioners who ask "available to whom, when and where, and 
how much 1'' The majority admits that petitioners cannot be 
guilty of contempt if the injunction which they violated is 
so uncertain that they could not determine what it required 
them to do. If petitioners are to be found guilty of contempt 
because of a violation of the injunction, interpreted in the 
light of the findings of fact, it appears to me that they may 
only be held liable for Vernon's share of the estimated cost 
of $21,000,000, because that is the estimate on which the 
formula is based and which appears in People v. City of Los 
Angeles, supra, 83 Cal.App.2d 627, at page 637. The record 
does not show that any demand was made on them for any 
sum approximating this amount. 
If petitioners are to be held to a proportionate share of 
the total cost of the plant which, at the time of the commence-
ment of this proceeding, was only 50 per cent complete and 
had already exceeded the total estimated amount, then this 
action is premature. There is no possible way for petitioners 
to know what Vern on's proportionate share will be when the 
sewage plant is completed. 
The majority opinion in this case is a typical illustration 
of the saying that "hard cases make bad law." Because, as 
a matter of public welfare, the sewage disposal plant is neces-
sary, petitioners are to be imprisoned and fined for relying 
on the law as set forth in the cases heretofore decided which 
have held that the affidavit in a contempt action must set forth 
the facts with particularity, and that the judgment allegedly 
violated must be sufficiently certain so that it could be carried 
into effect. 
From the foregoing it appears that the majority ·opinion 
violates recognized concepts of law applicable to contempt 
proceedings in order to reach a result, the justness and sound-
ness of which is, to say the least, questionable. I cannot, 
therefore, subscribe to such holding and would annul the 
order here under review. 
The opinion was modified to read as above printed and 
petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the application 
should be granted. 
